Deciphering the Effects of Decentralization on Water Rights: State to Urban Inconsistencies in Bolivia by Webber, Kyle G
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2016
Deciphering the Effects of Decentralization on
Water Rights: State to Urban Inconsistencies in
Bolivia
Kyle G. Webber
University of Colorado at Boulder, kywe6043@colorado.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
Part of the Human Geography Commons, Infrastructure Commons, Latin American Studies
Commons, Organization Development Commons, Political Science Commons, Urban Studies
Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Webber, Kyle G., "Deciphering the Effects of Decentralization on Water Rights: State to Urban Inconsistencies in Bolivia" (2016).
Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 1112.
 
Deciphering the Effects of  
Decentralization on Water Rights: 
 
State to Urban Inconsistencies in Bolivia	  
 
 
Kyle G. Webber, Geography Department 
University of Colorado at Boulder 
Honors Program: Spring 2016 
 
Thesis Advisor 
Joe Bryan | Human Geography 
 
Committee Members 
Lorraine Bayard de Volo | Women and Gender Studies 
William Travis | Department of Geography 
 
 kyle.webber@colorado.edu	  	  
DECIPHERING	  EFFECTS	  OF	  DECENTRALIZATION	  ON	  WATER	  RIGHTS	   2	  




































DECIPHERING	  EFFECTS	  OF	  DECENTRALIZATION	  ON	  WATER	  RIGHTS	  	   3	  
Introduction	  	  
Nearly sixteen years have passed since protestors in Cochabamba’s Water War 
(La Guerra del Agua) ousted private water corporation Aguas de Tunari from the country 
of Bolivia (Shultz, 2008).  The protests brought to light the social inequalities of access to 
water, both for drinking and sanitation, in the city and finally demanded accountability 
from those responsible. However, Cochabamba continues to suffer from severe regional, 
and national-scale class segregation concerning human rights to water. This dynamic 
occurs in the face of the city’s faltering management of the urban water supply.  Due to 
small-scale privatization, the quality of water is unreasonably split between north and 
south regions of the city (M. West, 2014).  In 2016, the city’s main water supplier 
SEMAPA (Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado) still fails to provide 
potable water to Cochabamba’s poorest peri-urban region in the south. Here, water needs 
are normally met in a combination of small-scale social institutions known as water 
committees (comités de agua) that self-manage and oversee a neighborhood’s water 
supply system, and tanker trucks known as aguateros that transport water to the region. 
However regional these social inequalities may seem, I argue that they are posited 
by larger, overarching state policies that have allowed them to persist.  Major political 
reform implemented during the height of Bolivia’s neoliberal era has given historically 
oppressed communities their long-sought autonomy from the state, while simultaneously 
producing a market-based system that suggests nationwide economic success.  In this 
study I reveal how two state policies, appealing at both local and national levels, have 
jointly manifested a seemingly perfect scenario for improving the lives of marginalized 
groups, but in reality continues to hinder communities dependent on small-scale 
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privatization in acquiring potable water. Furthermore, these state policies pacify 
politically frustrated communities by endowing desired autonomy, which unfortunately 
devolves communication to lower governmental tiers thus preventing the chance for 
social change.   
First, decentralization remodeled the power structure of Bolivia’s political system. 
By reducing state sovereignty and allocating more responsibility to the municipal level, 
decentralization aimed to make public investment more efficient and increase the speed 
of local development (Kohl 2002, Faguet 2012, M. West, 2014).  Moreover, 
decentralization was also an effort to “deepen democracy” and decrease inequalities by 
bringing the government closer to the people, developing their political voice to be better 
heard by municipal level governments (Faguet, 2015, Postero, 2013).  For Bolivia’s 
central government, this redirects public political opposition that has historically led to 
national disturbance.  The gap between the state and local sectors established due to 
decentralization allocated neighborhood communities the autonomy and capability to 
take warranted responsibility of water provisions and resource management.  Many 
times, this autonomy exists in the form of non-politically recognized water committees 
poised by their self-sustaining efforts.  However, as much as decentralization empowers 
those most in need, it also perpetuates inequalities in the area concerning access to water. 
The 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP, Ley de Participación 
Popular) expanded decentralization.  Designed to accommodate demands for more 
community control, the law deflected mounting criticisms of the state over their habitual 
neglect towards Bolivians. LPP redirects large portions of national revenue towards local 
provisions, thus making foreign investment once seen as a debilitating maneuver, 
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appealing even at the local level.  The LPP’s effect on decentralization has been to create 
a stabilized system that simultaneously promotes autonomy and economic success.  What 
it does not do is mitigate the struggles in acquiring potable water and instead deepens 
Cochabamba residents’ dependence on private sources. 
In this project, I examine the ways in which the inhabitants of District 14, an 
informal settlement in the peri-urban area of Cochabamba, Bolivia address their 
residential water needs and confront their past and continued dependency on private well 
owners.  With regard to the LPP, the unfortunate negative impacts of resource 
distribution reinforces negligence by the state in providing sufficient aid for those 
affected by an unethical, local-level market that refers to water as something profitable. 
This paradox illuminates a tension in Evo’s Bolivia.  At one pole is the embrace of 
indigenous concepts such as “buen vivir” (to live well) to expand understandings of rights 
to a clean environment, potable water, and other basic necessities.  Morales’ Movement 
Towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS) has made these policies central 
to their government and characterizes their opposition to neoliberal reforms (Ledo, 
2013).  At the other end is the state’s reliance on decentralization policies to devolve 
political authority to communities while deepening their reliance on markets to meet 
basic needs.  Those policies have tended to concentrate economic power in large 
corporations and the central government.   
The paper is organized as follows:  A literature review interprets Latin America’s 
political past and the impact created on urban areas due to dynamic shifts in power and 
policies.  This precedes a quick look into what defines a city and the significance this 
brings to the study.  Focusing on the unique story and process of what decentralization 
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means for Bolivia and concentrating on one urban area in particular, I examine its past 
and present relationship with the state government regarding the distribution of water.  I 
then examine the implications of these larger issues at an even more specific, local level.  





Human life is dependent on water.  As an essential element, water sustains us in 
our everyday lives.  It is fundamental to our existence.  We have appropriately 
romanticized the element incorporating it into our cultures and religions, developing a 
bond that goes beyond its physical properties.  Therefore, it is quite perplexing on a 
planet that is water-abundant, humans have discovered a way to make clean water a 
luxury unavailable to 783 million of the earth’s people while leaving 2.5 billion without 
adequate sanitation (United Nations, 2013).   
 In 2010, the UN declared potable water a human right for all, calling on state and 
international organizations to “provide financial resources, help capacity-building and 
technology transfer[s] to …particular developing countries” (United Nations, 2014).  In 
2016 South America’s poorest country, Bolivia falls short in making this human right to 
access a reality.  According to Carmen Ledo (2004), a Cochabamba academic who 
studies water politics in the city, many Bolivians continue to rely on private sources of 
water to meet their daily needs.  Their right to water, in other words, is a function of their 
own ability to pay for it.  This political dilemma facing the country has been years in the 
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making.  In order to unravel Bolivia’s dilemma utilizing an urban political ecology lens 
and an urban metabolism framework, a historical understanding of the nation is 
necessary.   
 Neoliberal reform in Bolivia started in the 1980’s, and was initially hailed as the 
solution to the country’s economic woes and political stability.  At the time, the country 
was engulfed in economic crisis.  Bolivia’s Import Subsidization Industrialization (ISI) 
system in the 1970’s favored the limitation of foreign trade and the growth of domestic 
industry.  The imperfections of ISI resulted in many economic failures including 
increased debt and inflation.  Inflation was over 12,000% and the national currency, the 
boliviano, was losing value (Shultz, 2008).   
The solution to these woes was proposed by US economist Jeffrey Sachs who in 
1985 proposed a “Structural Adjustment Program” (SAPS) to Bolivia’s National 
Revolutionary Movement party (MNR) (Kohl, 2001).  The SAPS were loans supplied by 
institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  They 
were given to debt-ridden countries granted that they followed the banks’ suggested 
method of restructuring the economy. This method aimed to create a suitable 
environment for free trade.  It required “states to privatize state-owned enterprises”, 
"deregulate industry, orient industry toward export, and drop all subsidies and trade 
barriers” in order to encourage foreign investment (Postero, 2013, p. 28).  This 
accentuated the already existing dependency on the extraction of Bolivia’s natural 
resources, which would lure “regional and global trade agreements” (p. 28).  One critical 
part of the SAPS that made much of this possible was the cutting of social spending.  The 
same institutions that curated SAPs were forced to develop other programs in order to 
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ameliorate the social impacts that came along with them.  This certain “relief” is essential 
in order for such neoliberal models to function as intended.    
For Bolivia, the economic structural readjustments and social-aid provided by 
outside investors was solely to ensure a “stable social and political environment for 
private firms” that would need such an environment since the job market was eliminated 
through controlling the industrial sector (Kohl, 2001 pg. 2). Instead of success, Sachs’ 
privatization-policies caused Bolivia to lose money while private companies reaped the 
benefits of the state.   
Reforms that liberalized the market lead to the collapse of Bolivia’s agrarian 
sector that could not compete with cheap imports. This caused a surge of unemployment 
and brought about huge rural-urban-displacement.  The gap between the poor and rich 
widened as surplus went into the hands of foreign investors and the population, whose 
social spending was reduced, was burdened to discovering their own means to healthcare, 
education etc. (Postero, 2013). In an attempt to revive the country’s poor economic state, 
President Sánchez de Lozada pushed for new laws that opened up Bolivia’s industrial 
sector to foreign investment with the 1994 Law of Capitalization. The law facilitated the 
sale of over 50% of state industries to be sold to private companies.  This marked the 
switch to private enterprises taking on the states role in the socio-hydroscape. This 
included turning over the city of Cochabamba’s municipal water utility in 1998 to French 
company Agua de Illimani.   
It didn’t take long for neoliberal policies to meet with opposition from civilians 
contesting the sale of state infrastructure to private companies. The incentives for foreign 
investment are clear.  “Big money” bought desperately needed new infrastructure, 
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promising jobs and improvement in living conditions.  For Cochabamba, an agreement 
with Aguas del Illimani would indicate the revitalization and enhancement of the city’s 
dwindling piped water network that could potentially reach neglected water-poor regions.   
In turn, investors expected to be paid back for their services. In the case of water in 
Cochabamba, this meant rate-hikes for citizens without regard for their ability to pay.  
Their efforts transformed water into a commodity as opposed to a right, something to be 
acquired only through the market. 
Similar processes occurred with education, healthcare, and transportation, 
sparking public protests.  Between February 2000 and April 2001, the country of Bolivia 
was shut down three times (Kohl, 2001).  Issues resolved through greater public 
participation would become the same power successful in electing Evo Morales as the 
first indigenous president in 2005.   
Evo gained the attention of Bolivians by promising what seemed to be an anti-
neoliberal agenda that aimed at ending privatization and limiting foreign interest.  
However, it was undoubtedly due to a newly discovered strength in numbers that resulted 
in a high turnout of indigenous voters.  For the first time, Evo Morales and the MAS 
party were politically representing historically oppressed indigenous groups, who make 
up over 70% of Bolivia’s population.  By 2009, the national constitution was rewritten in 
order to directly incorporate the indigenous belief, “buen vivir” for a new framework in 
defining social wellbeing.  This is the indigenous ideology meaning to ‘live well’ in 
harmony with Pachamama (mother earth) that rejects the emphasis on the individual 
associated with capitalism and replaces it with an emphasis on indigenous communities’ 
understanding and reliance on nature (Gudynas, 2013).  A human right, now 
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constitutionally recognized, suggests the necessary collaboration from the government in 
acquiring basic needs for Bolivia’s population.  In spite of these reforms, Bolivia remains 
the poorest country in South America, with over 50% of people living in poverty.  
Moreover, the country’s diverse indigenous groups make up the majority of their poor 
population.  On the other side, wealthy urban elites who have historically controlled 
political institutions continue to embrace neoliberal policies that work in their favor.  
Interestingly, Evo’s Bolivia, which has recently been popularized for its 
unforeseen economic success, is experiencing similar tensions felt by its neoliberal 
predecessor.  Most notable is popular opposition to recently announced plans to construct 
a highway through national forest and protected indigenous territory known as TIPNIS.  
The road is intended to increase the production and trade of logging throughout the 
Amazon Rainforest empowering the MAS’s extractavist mentality that fuels Bolivia’s 
ostensible economic success. Cloaked by these national controversies are lesser-known, 
though perhaps even more pressing tensions situated at the urban level.  Here, small-scale 
privatization continues to hinder the livelihoods of civilians by making drinkable water a 
privilege.  Although one of these issues gains global priority over the other, we will see 




Bolivia’s history is marked by the repeated rise and fall of the nation’s health.  
This includes the wellbeing of a country’s “socio-nature” relationship that exists in part 
with its people, policies, culture and government and their effect on the role of natural 
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resources.  These resources provide life and power in the form of basic human needs, 
infrastructure, technological advancement and capital, as seen with mining (Swyngedouw 
2004, p. 12).  Furthermore, we can associate the control of natural resources with the 
control of power, given that basic human needs such as water, air, and food (the 
metabolic requirements for human survival), are subject to the disorder and fluctuation of 
ever-changing governmental policies that are generally manipulated by the few who 
harness said power.  
The hydrosocial cycle is fueled on the tensions between political, social, and 
economic power-relations.  Water’s life-sustaining property adds to its use-value and 
makes it sensitive to “to intense social struggle[s] along class, gender, and ethnic 
cleavages for access and/or control” (Swyngedouw, p. 2, 2003).  Governments, 
organizations, and public and private agents all find their appropriate role in the 
hydrosocial cycle.     
To understand the socio-nature network is paramount in understanding the 
dilemma that exists in the most impoverished and underdeveloped countries in regards to 
an unequal distributions of resources.  This is especially true where a state’s decisions on 
the extraction and allocation of a resource and the policies that surround these decisions 
directly affect the lives and status of the people involved (Short, 2014). In Bolivia, urban 
settlements experience vast inequalities when obtaining potable water due to state 
policies that increase complexities in local sectors (Spronk et al. 2012).  In Cochabamba, 
the private water utility has little incentive to build out water infrastructure since it is only 
marginally profitable.  It is more common for states to provide the necessary 
development granted the state deems itself responsible.   
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Providing efficient infrastructure has historically been a key role for the state in 
the country’s socio-hydroscape.  In other words, the health of a city reflects the health of 
the state in its entirety.  However, this does not devalue the power, independence, and 
inimitability a city is solely capable of possessing (Harvey, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2012).  
In fact, we are able to trace a city’s socio-hydroscape and bring the concept of “health” to 
a more intimate level revealing how decentralization adds kinks to the flow of resources 
in the urban area.  Neoliberal reform was not only the culprit in the growth of peri-urban 
areas but was also what pushed the states role in the socio-hydro cycle over to private 
hands. 
Unfortunately for Cochabamba, a system exists where potable water, in all its 
stages of the cyclical process of entering and exiting a city, becomes a ‘good’ in itself 
that defines one’s placement in society depending on its affordability (see Swyngedouw, 
2003).  Peri-urban areas must also be included as part of the city in order to reach all city-
dwellers in need.  This is important in order to maintain what Erik Swyngedouw calls the 
“metabolism ...of the wider social fabric”, claiming that the health of urban areas are 
directly dependent on the “ ...supply, circulation, and elimination of water” 
(Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 1, 28).  By examining how well the city functions in regard to its 
socio-hydro avenues (and how decentralization affects the distribution of this resource), 
we can ultimately distinguish the direct effects the conditions of water provisions have on 
Cochabamba’s peri-urban areas.  This helps better understand the ‘health’ of 
Cochabamba or, the lack thereof. 
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The	  Dilemma	  in	  Cochabamba	  
The municipality of Cochabamba is divided into 14 districts, each further divided 
into neighborhoods now politically recognized under the LPP.  Districts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 
14 make up the southern zone or also known as zona sur, comprising a peri-urban area 
where more than half of Cochabamba’s 500,000 residents live (Ledo, 2013).  The 
population of zona sur is growing at an annual rate of 8.9%, roughly triple the 2.9% rate 
for the city as a whole (Ledo, 2013).  Since 2012, the growth rate has increased to 13.5% 
(Veizaga, 2015).  This growth has taxed infrastructure needed to provide basic services 
such as drinking water and sanitation that has never adequately met residents’ needs.  As 
much as Cochabamba is ecologically water-poor (e.g. highly contaminated water and 
stressed aquifers due to over pumping) Cochabamba’s residents are water-less due to the 
city’s lackluster capacity to serve the population, rather than physical scarcity.   
The population growth Cochabamba experienced in the 1970’s due to the failure 
of ISI policies was only the beginning of the impending effects of urbanization. 
Neoliberal reforms in the 90’s had deepened these devastating effects.  The state’s role as 
the country’s main employer had devolved into the hands of foreign owners in an effort 
to reduce employment.  Indigenous workers in mining towns like Oruro, Potosi, and El 
Alto were out of work due to a sudden lack of employment opportunities within the tin 
industry and therefore began to migrate to the outer-sections of urban areas.  This created 
a peri-urban area of strong indigenous character around the outskirts of the Cochabamba.  
Here, they could avoid the high fees associated with the inner-city while living close 
enough to take advantage of the informal job market that exists in the downtown districts 
(Spronk, 2007).  
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To this day, most informal jobs, which cater to tourists and consumers living in 
the north of the city, are filled by inhabitants of zona sur where potable water only 
reaches 6.8% of the population (M. West, 2014). The municipality has historically 
neglected this area, focusing instead on providing public services and infrastructure to the 
more affluent north, further fuelling divergence between the city’s people.  
While SEMAPA was failing to fulfill the city’s needs, Bechtel was no better.  For 
the two years the foreign corporation had charge of the city’s water supply, it made little 
effort to extend its piped network to zona sur.  Enhancing the already decaying network 
that runs through the northern part of the city was a last priority for the corporation.  Due 
to the poor physical condition of the water pipes, around 47% of extracted water is lost 
during transportation from the water source (2014).  Worse, the degraded metal allows 
biological and chemical pollutants into the water.  Moreover, SEMAPA has been 
notoriously involved in financial corruption even before the Water War.  More recent 
changes in the management of the water utility have yielded similar outcomes.1    
Growth of the zona sur has sent informal settlements up hills near the base of the 
city’s sloping terrain (Spronk et. al, 2012, p. 439).  These historically dry hills hold little 
water to meet growing demand.  Periodic droughts make conditions worse. Furthermore, 
the terrain is composed of hard and almost impenetrable rock that makes well drilling 
only possible with more expensive machinery.  In 2010, Only 2 out of 23 wells drilled in 
zona sur provides potable water, while the remaining only produce contaminated and 
salty water (Ledo, 2010).  Though this unfortunate, the issues that exist in Cochabamba’s 
socio-hydro network far surpass the importance of any land limitations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Carlos Crespo Flores; Director de Medio Ambiente at Universidad de Mayor San Simón (UMMS).  
Interview; March 2015	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According to a survey conducted by CEDIB (Centro de Documentación e 
Información Bolivia) in 2007, only Districts 5 and 6 in the southern zone had connections 
to potable water via SEMAPA, although this did not cover the entire population of the 
districts. Around 86.58% of the homes in District 5 are directly connected while only 
77% in District 6 are (CEDIB, 2007).  In 2013 almost 100% of the inhabitants in the 
city’s center had direct connections to SEMAPA’s piped water network as opposed to 
roughly 3% on average of homes covered in the remaining Districts (7, 8, 9, and 14) (M. 
West, 2014).  
In the districts apart from 5 and 6, water is mostly provided by a private network 
or by personal sources that are independently managed such as water committees or 
privately funded wells.  The private network is dominated by aguateros that transport 
water by truck from private wells in the city’s affluent north to the water-poor areas in the 
south.  The aguateros can be found in all parts of the city, dispensing water on scheduled 
visits to residents of the poorer neighborhoods/peri-urban areas like the zona sur.  They 
perform a “middle man” role, selling the water to homes in zona sur and at times for 
more than 3 times the price than what they originally purchased.  This price gouging can 
have devastating implications on the people who are already living off miniscule salaries 
(Swyngedouw, 2004).  Despite topological and geographical limitations “[u]neven 
development is not a product of natural environment” as Harvey explains “but is created 
through social, political and economic processes of exclusion such as dispossession” 
(Harvey, 2003; cited in M. West, 2014).    
Water committees and other small-scale organizations have explored alternatives 
to the aguateros, including the construction of community cisterns and self-funded piped 
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networks or wells.  Far more common are smaller barrels maintained by individual 
households. The barrels are capable of holding an amount of water only lasting one 
household a few days at a time.  Normally, they are filled by the aguateros whom are paid 
directly by the water user at time of service.  Unfortunately, the price and the informal 
ways in which they are forced to obtain water is not the worst part.  Because the aguatero 
union is a private network and is only subject to moderate regulation, there are many 
loopholes that allow them to transport contaminated water either from its source or in the 
duration the water resides in adulterated tanks (M. West, 2014).  Because contaminated 
water is better than no water at all, the union remains in business as long as there are 
people in the area. 
This increases inequality where ownership of water delegates superiority over 
another sector.  A study conducted by Madeline West (2014) explains how even after the 
Water War, privatization of water persists across the entire municipality of Cochabamba.  
Now, a more impenetrable and tangled network of privatization haunts the city.  This is 
especially possible in regards to how decentralization has removed the local level further 
away from the national government, the one possible entity that could implement and 
control regulations on this small-scale water market. Without strict rules or laws enforced 
by the state, the aguateros take advantage of the peri-urban area by offering a price on 
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Decentralization	  in	  Bolivia	  
Decentralized governmental structures have been popularized over the last two 
decades to lessen the drawbacks of previous neoliberal policies. The outcomes have been 
highly variable.  Political scientist Jean-Paul Faguet, comments that the range of 
outcomes defies characterization as “good” or “bad” (Faguet, 2015, p. 10).  However, in 
broad terms, decentralization promotes greater self-governance and decision-making by 
communities in moving sovereignty away from the state (i.e., national, central) 
government (Faguet, 2012). This entails the devolution of  “specific functions” including 
“administrative, political, and economic” decisions that now belong to “democratic local” 
(or municipal governments in Bolivia’s case) that are politically recognized (2012, p. 2).  
As the ideologies behind decentralization can be defined in such a way, many argue 
decentralization has in fact consolidated state sovereignty.  This description of a general 
decentralized-system provided by Faguet proves especially interesting in Bolivia’s case 
since he assumes that these newly empowered governments are “democratic.” 
Decentralization was an attempt by the Lozada led government (93-97, 02-03) to 
increase democracy and alleviate poverty by giving control of resources to the 
municipalities that would, in turn, lead to state-wide improvements (Postero, 2013).  
Ideally, decentralization acknowledges that communities are better able to improve their 
surroundings and community health than centralized state institutions. It does leave the 
responsibility to the citizens to acquire their own basic needs without the direct assistance 
of the state, that is to say, to some extent, as the subsequent implementation of LPP 
would see to the redirection of monetary aid.  This responsibility is intentional, designed 
to increase participation, but tends to be quite damaging for areas lacking certain and 
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perhaps crucial technological assistance aside from monetary aid. I will expand on this 
further in my case study.   
The LPP established small communities or barrios called Grassroots Territorial 
Organizations or OTBs (Organizaciones Territoriales de Base) whose small sizes were 
intended to delegate accountability to the citizens and improve public goods as a result of 
increased community participation (Postero, 2013; Faguet, 2015). During Bolivia’s 
transition, over 300 municipalities were created in this endeavor.  Creating additional 
municipalities (including numerous OTBs within each) was a geographical exercise 
performed in an attempt to include every Bolivian. This was an essential piece to 
decentralization in order to promote governance at a scale conducive to deep democracy 
with the idea of being inclusive.  
Under municipalities, the citizens of each OTB elected a council composed of a 
mayor and councilors that represent the community on issues regarding local 
provisions.  Most importantly, in order for OTBs to enhance local provisions, the LPP 
directs roughly 20% of national tax revenue to the OTBs.  This occurs via the municipal 
Ministry of Public Works (M. West, 2014).  The smaller geographical areas 
(municipalities down to OTBs) help LPP define the homogeneity of particular need as 
opposed to the heterogeneity of broader regions that result in mixed demand.  In other 
words, the type of need is discovered through decreasing disagreements that exist in 
higher numbers (Faguet, 2013).   
In Cochabamba where one OTB may need jerseys for their football team, another 
say, in zona sur where the majority of communities are water poor, generally use their 
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municipal-provided funding to strengthen their water systems.2  In zona sur, and OTBs 
water systems is often enhanced in collaboration with water committees who in water-
constrained scenarios purchase large cisterns and pipes to connect houses, or attempt to 
dig wells that reach aquifers.  Many times the amount of money offered is insufficient in 
funding any large project it in its entirety, as we will see with one particular OTB in 
District 14.  
An OTB also works as an oversight committee that is not only able to participate 
in public hearings and comment on legal decisions, but is also responsible for supervising 
all municipal services. The oversight committee ensures that community projects are 
decided by vote of council members and also that these projects receive their funding.  If 
the oversight committee is not capable, a completely separate entity exists in order to 
disclose corruption.3  This creates a clear protocol in order to hold municipalities 
accountable and for OTBs to uncover any trace of corruption.  
Bolivia’s history is peppered with stories of political deception and therefor, the 
government was tactful in the LPPs conception. The amount of money provided is 
dependent on a per capita basis making amounts transparent to citizens and discouraging 
misconduct in high positions. However, this law is not particularly strict and monetary 
amounts can be determined on a need-basis if mayors (or councilors) of OTBs are 
sufficiently convincing when making requests for public investment.  Success is often 
dependent on the political activity and competence of the councilmen, a scenario where 
levels of education may impede this in less-affluent neighborhoods (Faguet, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  Carlos Crespo Flores; Director de Medio Ambiente at Universidad de Mayor San Simón (UMMS).  
Interview; March 2015	  3	  These	  were	  better	  known	  as	  a comité de vigilancia or Watchdog Committees.	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 In theory, decentralization only allowed Bolivia to become stable once fused with 
LPP.  The law was dually designed not only to introduce a better method in enhancing 
public provisions but was also an attempt to mitigate the contentions between local 
communities and the states decisions in allowing the countries economic stability to rely 
on foreign interest.  The neoliberal reforms that contented in separating both sectors, state 
and local, were able to persist through decentralization once LPP found its place in 
supporting local inhabitants.  Therefore, the country could remain dependent on foreign 
corporations privatizing provisions as long as it indirectly supported communities.  
Although this was beneficial for some time, once water provisions were subsumed to this 
practice, the LPP proved ineffective to pacify citizens of Cochabamba.  The holes in the 
Law of Popular Participation and the demoralizing effects of neoliberalism, where the 
boundaries between “what is and is not” considered a commodity, were reflected in the 
Water War.  
 
 
Mitigating	  Social	  Unrest	  
The Water War in Cochabamba in 2000 captured this paradox, challenging 
neoliberal reforms while deepening processes of decentralization, transforming the city’s 
troubles in delivering water into a matter of human rights. In 1998, the national 
government was convinced by The World Bank to sell off portions of its natural 
resources to foreign companies.  A French company, Aguas de Illimani signed a contract 
with Bolivia that authorized the privatization of the entire water system in the city of La 
Paz and its neighboring city El Alto.  In Cochabamba, a joint venture launched by the 
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California-based engineering company, Bechtel, and Aguas del Tunari, struck a similar 
deal.  The deal sold off the companies main assets of the city’s previous water supplier, 
the state-run SEMAPA. The two companies took over the current municipal water 
systems, privatizing water provisions in an approach that was intended to be pro-poor and 
dissipate urban inequalities (Olivera, 2014). The joint venture used their construction of 
new water infrastructure to justify a unilateral rate hike. 
Connections to SEMAPAS water network used by Aguas del Tunari exist mostly 
in the north of the city and are only accessible to small numbers in the south. Therefore 
even before improving piped infrastructure, the northern inhabitants were the only ones 
affected by Bechtel’s tax hike.  Two months after the city signed its contract with 
Bechtel, the Bolivian government approved the The Potable Water and Sanitation Law 
(Ley de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario, Law 2029, 1998). Law 
2029 granted any private company ownership of all water in the municipality, including 
rights over infrastructure built by neighborhood water committees in the zona sur.  The 
law offered no compensation for the water committees, justifying their expropriation by 
the joint venture as necessary to give Bechtel and Aguas de Tunari the leverage needed to 
improve water provision (Shultz, 2008). Across the city and particularly in the zona sur, 
the water committees met the law with protests that escalated into the Water War (Ledo 
2013, M. West 2014).  
To the water committees, the state’s actions demonstrated their historical 
negligence towards the less fortunate and fueled their desires for greater separation from 
the state. This is particularly important for inhabitants in the south zone when considering 
what positive effects decentralization has for their continued autonomy. The national 
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government’s withdrawal from peri-urban areas (via decentralization) gave residents 
almost complete independence in regards to water provisions, save for the exception of 
monetary aid.  The communities were free to control their water, though without the 
financial support necessary to make basic improvements.  As a result, water provisioning 
stagnated, exacerbating the already unequal access to water and sanitation. While the 
Water War reinforced the rights of the water committees, it did little to change this 
standstill.  If anything, it left the committees in need of aid and distrustful of the central 
government for justifiable reasons.  
Following the Water War’s success in ending the privatization of water in 
Cochabamba, the grassroots organization that was responsible for organizing the protests, 
the Coordinadores de Defensa de Agua y Vida (Coordinator of Defense of Water and 
Life) led by Bolivian Oscar Olivera signed an agreement with the government which led 
to the amendment of law 2029 on April 11, 2000.  This law eliminated monopoly rights 
to water and gave the ownership of water and land to the citizens of Cochabamba. The 
guarantee of municipal support to advance public participation was also added under this 
law and subsequently renamed Law 2066 (Spronk, 2014; Ledo, 2013).  The agreement 
restored SEMAPA’s control of the municipal water system.  The elimination of 
monopoly rights had ended the privatization fiasco.  However in the end, it only reverted 
Cochabamba back to its previous water issues save for the new guarantee of municipal 
support.  
Water committees and OTBs play a vital role in the socio-hydro relationship that 
occurs in Cochabamba. Although water committees are not legally recognized by the 
state they are inevitably politicized through their forced relations with private water 
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utilities and the less common relationship some have with OTBs.  And as both are 
organized to essentially do the same thing (improve public provisions), they also capture 
the holes in Bolivia’s decentralization policy.  One particular OTB in District 14 provides 
the perfect example in emphasizing these drawbacks.  More importantly, it reveals the 
exact issues in regards to where the Law of Popular Participation fails in providing 




District 14 is in the southeast region of Cochabamba near the foothills of the 
Andes. Not unlike the other districts that make up zona sur, this district suffers from 
inadequate water sanitation and distribution.  Better known as Villa Pagador, most of its 
residents are migrants from the highland city of Oruro, a mining town affected by the 
economic collapse in the 70’s.  One water committee and OTB in this district, Central 
Itocta, stands out in its attempts to achieve its own source of potable water.   
A water committee is a neighborhood organization formed by the people of a 
particular sector in order to improve certain aspects of their water systems.  The families 
who belong to water committees elect representatives usually once a year in order to form 
a council of leaders similar to the structure of an OTB.  Unlike OTBs, water committees 
remain independent from any form of political recognition in the legal system (Olivera, 
2015). However, water committees are not always partial to one territory and at times 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  All	  data	  on	  District	  14	  was	  received	  through	  personal	  interviews,	  other	  academic	  literature,	  and	  UMSS	  (Universidad	  de	  Mayor	  San	  Simon)	  library	  in	  Cochabamba.	  	  All	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  by	  myself	  in	  Spanish	  including	  those	  interviews	  with	  Boliviano’s	  outside	  of	  the	  district.	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incorporate multiple or even fractions of the population of other OTBs.  Normally, each 
family, or home is required to pay a monthly fee to the water committee, that in turn is 
used to improve the community's water systems.  The fee often depends on the size of the 
household and the current projects the water committee is involved.  
Central Itocta works as an OTB and is also its own water committee.  We see that 
this is more common in clusters of poorer OTBs.  The type of need in the area is obvious 
and the collaboration with adjacent communities, despite their needs being similar, only 
complicate project planning.  Additionally, the municipal funding given to these poorer 
OTBs is essential in realizing expensive and necessary water projects.   
Central Itocta’s water committee is made up of 340 partners (over 2,000 residents 
in total) and requires five positions: a communitarian president, vice-president, secretary 
and two supervisors who all work in conjunction with the families in the community and 
vote on potential projects that solely aim to enhance their current water system. The 
municipal funds are often insufficient to cover the costs of material and planning for 
necessary projects and therefore, are supplemented by monthly payments from 
community members. Member fees vary according to household size and income 
although families unable to pay can remain connected to their current system.  This is the 
OTBs ethical practice, reflective of their commitment to clean water for drinking and 
household use as a basic right.  
In the spring of 2015, Central Itocta had a ten-year old, underground, piped water-
network that supplied water directly to each house.  The water system is connected to a 
tank that holds roughly 12 cubic meters and costs 150bs (bolivianos, roughly $22) to 
refill using the aguateros.  Because the capacity of the tank is limited, aguateros must 
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refill it four to six trips per day in order to efficiently support the community.  According 
to the vice president of Central Itocta’s water committee, Done Daniel Flores, the whole 
town uses about 60,000 – 100,000 liters of water per day.  That implies each family pays 
on average 60bs – 80bs ($9 - $12) (4-6 meters cubed) each month.  The piped network 
was built, and managed by the community itself in one year (2005 – 2006).  The project 
was half funded by municipal money and half by some of the partners within the water 
committee.  Each member paid $222 (1525bs).  However, this would not have been 
possible without the help of local NGO, AguaTuya who helped design the system and is 
responsible for creating the intricate mapping involved in the process.  
In addition to needing support in designing the project, the cistern or tank 
provided was realized through municipal aid.  The entire project was an enormous 
upgrade to their previous year-round dependency on aguateros and helped the community 
buy water in larger quantities changing the price of water from 30bs to around 15bs (per 
cubic meter).  Before Central Itocta was successful in acquiring a piped water system, 
barrels of water bought from the aguateros were 4bs for the amount of 200 liters.  Now 
that they are able to buy their water in bulk, large amounts of water need to be 
transported to one certain area where the cistern resides.  To make this cost-effective for 
the aguateros, the price to fill their larger tank has increased to 6bs/200 liters.   
This highlights the aguateros imminent control.  Even though Central Itocta has 
used municipal money to scale up their water network, water prices are still 3 times the 
price of what people in the north pay.4  The average salary of the citizens of Central 
Itocta is approximately 2,000bs / year.5  Therefore, the percentage of their annual income 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Resident in Cala Cala neighborhood, Personal communication; February 2015 
5 Don Daniel Flores; President of OTB Central Itocta, Interview; May 2015 
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far exceeds the 3% that the UN says is the maximum one should pay for water to be 
considered potable (UN Water Decade Program, 2010). 
 The creation of a new OTB is often necessary.  For example, where one section 
of an OTB in Bolivia might find that their municipal funding will be better used to 
acquire electricity, another desires to remain in the “waiting game” to collect an efficient 
amount in order to fund a water well or a new pipeline.  According to the Municipal 
Council of Cercado, in 2009, Villa Pagador increased from 21 OTBs to 29.  
 In other instances, OTBs have combined to better meet mutual needs and merge 
assets to fund like-minded projects. This has occurred in the same district where Central 
Itocta is located.  Multiple OTBs in the northern region of District 14 joined in order to 
form a stronger water committee.  This became known as APAAS (Asociación de 
Producción y Administración de Agua y Saneamiento).   
The OTBs that are a part of this collaborative committee are Primer Grupo, 
Segundo Grupo, Alto de la Alianza and a small portion of Sebastián Pagador.6  They are 
known for their numerous technological successes and self-sustaining capabilities.  They 
are especially admired for being one of the first water committees to possess a well 
efficient in dispensing potable water.  Having one of the few functioning wells in the 
area, the families associated with APAAS pay much nearer in cost to people in the north 
pay but still remain dependent on aguateros during the dry season. 
 In 2014, Central Itocta wanted to rid their dependency of the aguatero union just 
as APAAS did.  After months of planning, they hired a Chinese company to drill a well 
in the water committee’s area.  120 people out of the 340 members helped partially fund 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Oscar Perez; Student at UMSS and local resident in Villa Pagador; Personal Communication; May 2015 	  
DECIPHERING	  EFFECTS	  OF	  DECENTRALIZATION	  ON	  WATER	  RIGHTS	  	   27	  
the US $35,000 water well, with the remainder of the funds coming from a loan from a 
local bank. The Chinese company came for three days in February 2014 and drilled a 
well 120 meters into the hard rock under Central Itocta.  The water they found, however, 
turned out to be undrinkable, contaminated by high levels of salts and minerals, such as 
magnesium.  This raised the number of failed wells in the area to 22 out of 24.  In order 
to become drinkable, Central Itocta would have to finance a water treatment plant that is 
estimated to cost another $35,000.  Even then, Central Itocta would still lack the pumps 
and piping that are required in order to efficiently distribute to their homes.7  Without that 
infrastructure, Central Itocta remains reliant on private-well owners in the north.  
Small NGOs like AguaTuya are helping to fill the financial and technical gap 
opened by decentralization. Without them and municipal monetary aid, Central Itocta 
would not have 24-hour water distribution to their homes.  Small-scale organizations, like 
AguaTuya, are joining with water committees to fill the gap that exists in a decentralized 
government.  These areas that are already impoverished, like Central Itocta, have turned 
to large bank loans for projects that continue to give false hope.  This is not unique to 
Central Itocta as there are many other OTBs and water committees that experience the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Don Daniel Flores; Interview, 2015 
DECIPHERING	  EFFECTS	  OF	  DECENTRALIZATION	  ON	  WATER	  RIGHTS	   28	  
 
Discussion	  	  
Decentralization has given local entities more authority over day-to-day decision-
making and planning with inadequate economic support to meaningfully address their 
problems.  The gap between governments is exacerbated by neoliberal reforms that 
depend on the privatization of water.  The disconnect allows the state to abandon its 
promised role in providing Bolivians with potable water by not imposing regulations on 
private networks and by not providing necessary technical assistance.   
In order to lessen the social impact, NGOs, water committees and other small-
scale organizations are constantly filling this gap attempting to make up for what the state 
is not providing.  Where small-scale organizations are not sufficient in their capacity, 
communities are forced to rely on private sources, deepening the reach of the very 
neoliberal reforms that they set out to oppose.   
Decentralization has allowed the state to retain, and even consolidate its power 
over the economy, mitigating social unrest and cementing an extractavist mentality to 
support this. State laws set out to ameliorate the social impacts are ineffective in solely 
providing monetary aid.  The infrastructure that is funded by state aid is unsuccessful due 
to its failure in producing potable water.  This removes the state from Cochabamba’s 
socio-hydroscape, leaving the cyclical relationship to dwindle solely between people, 
private networks, and depleting aquifers.    
Decentralized government is intended to devolve power to more regional areas 
whose success allows them greater autonomy to meet local needs.  In theory, that 
capacity will improve access to basic services and provide the basis for economic growth. 
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One by one the improvements of social provisions in OTBs are thought to potentially 
define the entire state. Unfortunately, not all regions, large and small, are needed to do 
well in order for they’re to be a sense of national economic success.  Advocates of 
neoliberalism argue that this occurs by creating competition between municipalities in a 
mobile market of resources and, in turn, the multiple successes will eventually reflect one 
successful Bolivia (Faguet 2012, Postero, 2013).  However, this market exists at the 
expense of the livelihoods of the people whose involvement in the market is obligated 
due to the need rather than the demand of the product. 
Bolivia’s historical issues with rural-to-urban displacement made clear the 
potential consequences to huge political reform.  Because of their limitations in 
provisions, the chances of mobilization for citizens in the peri-urban area are higher.  
Therefore, the LPP aimed to mitigate any further chance of this happening again by 
intending to deter “ethnic mobilization” of urban areas and develop strong “democratic 
stability” to support this (K. West, 2015, p. 46).  However, it is less democratic stability 
that restricts their mobilization and more of what Madeline West calls a “stalemate” 
between unregulated private well owners and peri-urban communities.  The public’s 
dependency on private well owners and aguateros continues as long as they are able to set 
high prices on the never ending demand of their product.  If regulations were imposed on 
the private networks lowering the price of water, so would profits and the incentive to 
sell.  Zona sur either buys from aguateros, or worse, they have no water at all.  
LPP in conjunction with the decentralization of power is intended for a 
progressive push to dissipate striking inequalities that exist in concentrated urban areas 
by first supporting the most impoverished (Faguet, 2012).  Interestingly, the immediate 
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years following the implementation of the LPP, the funding for these specific provisions 
increased during a 3-year period before dropping substantially.8  The initial increase is 
used to support the argument for decentralization, devoting funds to the most 
impoverished and historically “neglected communities” to improve their ability to take on 
the added responsibilities that come with decentralization. That is to say, once the most 
water-deprived areas seemed to enhance their water supply networks, the argument is that 
their municipal aid was redirected away from water and towards a set of wide-ranging 
demands. The bettering of local provisions is the common explanation for why the 
attention in certain provisions had shifted.   
By 2003, it is said that 100% of OTBs had used municipal money to “strengthen” 
water systems (Faguet, 2015).  This marked a period where investments in water 
infrastructure substantially dropped.  I would argue that nearly all OTBs have invested 
copious amounts of money, but had not actually achieved potable water.  Even if 100% 
of investments were used in the most effective manner, it would not be enough to meet 
the need.   
The other side of the argument is self-evident as one experiences zona sur.  There 
are only so many ways to build or rebuild water networks that do not fabricate potable 
water until OTBs shift their attention towards more promising endeavors.  This ultimately 
results in a standstill with aguateros.  As long as wells in the area continue to dispense 
contaminated water, aguateros will remain the main providers in the area.   
Decentralization is thought to provide an avenue to express political voice, and in 
turn deepen democracy and deliver political stability.  In this sense, decentralization did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The periods of length in decreased investment are unique to each provision and not without their 
unpredictable increase in the years following the drop.   
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its duty, but fails at dissipating inequalities and alleviating poverty proven in the example 
of Cochabamba where resources remain unevenly distributed.  Nearly 20 years since the 
implementation of the LPP and one of the countries largest cities continues to suffer from 
stark inadequacies.  Obviously, providing more money has proven to be ineffective.  We 
have to ask if the gap between local and state is too big?  The simple necessity of water 
committees and their past and imminent failures is enough evidence to suggest something 
is lacking. 
The gap created between the state and local sectors is filled with external, and 
community established organizations.  Water committees, NGOs and other foundations 
fill this gap for many peri-urban neighborhoods and make up for the insufficient funding 
provided by municipal aid. This can be interpreted by the lackluster success for 
geographically small OTBs who depend on state aid.  
Because water committees, OTBs, NGOs, and other small-scale organizations 
make up a large complex web all involved in various forms of water directed projects, it 
is difficult to distinguish which contributed most to these high percentages.  In other 
words, it is hard to say if this is mostly the result of LPP directed funding (government 
aid), initiatives by water committees and NGOs (non-governmental aid), or the 
combination of the two since they often work together.   
Additionally, power relations between these groups are not without their 
suspicions.  AguaTuya, the non-profit responsible for Central Itocta’s piped water-
network receives municipal funding via third party initiatives.  Evidence suggests that the 
“non-profit” was forced to move out from zona sur due to local discrepancies.  Some 
water-focused programs were left unfinished leaving some OTBs in states worse off than 
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before (M. West, 2014). 
Additionally, where more poverty stricken communities who improve water 
systems through NGO funding and/or various forms of aid are often forced to use 
cheaper, less adequate materials (M. West, 2014).  This lends multiple problems.  The 
inadequate materials have short lifespans.  Quick degradation of water pipes leads to 
replacing them more frequently and mineral contamination. In addition to this, outward 
growth in infrastructure misleads people inside the community (and perhaps more 
importantly, those adjacent) as being perceived as success. 
It is surprising that some studies fail to acknowledge the immense diversity that 
frames political segregation in Bolivia along lines of race and class, but also the social 
inequalities that are common for urban areas in developing countries.  The 
inconsistencies in a decentralized state misrepresent the social complexity of governing 
of urban areas.  Just as Faguet argues we must not consider decentralization neither 
‘good’ nor ‘bad’, Swyngedouw explains how in urban areas policies that benefit one 
social group can be detrimental to another and are more immediately felt than at state 
level (2013).   
To use data that only portrays the nation as a whole will indefinitely result in 
error.  Urban and rural areas alike will encounter conflicts that are unknown to higher 
levels of government.  Harvey reinforces these implications by suggesting that 
“[s]cholars just focusing on states, will be flabbergasted …simply because significant 
things happen which one cannot capture looking solely at interstate dynamics” (Schouten, 
2008, quoted in interview).   
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Access to water and sanitation in general since the LPP was passed have 
increased by 40% in all of Bolivia (Faguet, 2012).  Between the years 2012 and 2014, 
88% of Bolivians were connected to water systems that experienced improvements and 
57% experienced improvements in sanitation (JMP, 2012; WHO, 2014, p. 54; Cited in M. 
West, 2014).  There is a stark difference in these data and those that represents zona sur.  
Therefore, we can say the urban area has a peculiar dilemma where these data are not 
relevant.  If nothing else, it represents the separate creature that an urban area becomes in 
a decentralized government.  
Cochabamba’s socio-hydro cycle has been completely disconnected from the 
central government.  Their share of control on water has been devalued to “funds” that 
provide infrastructure inefficient in providing potable water.  Without the states support, 
residents of Cochabamba share a socio-hydroscape with corrupt, for profit, private 
networks whose role has been to commoditize their product.  To make matters worse, the 
condition of the product, no matter how variable, will always sell.  Both private well 
owners and aguateros move contaminated water around the city of Cochabamba always 
at a seller’s price. 
Water committees are a major component in the socio-hydro relationship of the 
city and are inevitably intertwined with decentralization.  Almost all have working 
relationships with private water utilities and many rely on politically recognized OTBs. 
As much as water committees capture their desired autonomy away from the state, they 
are often indirectly sustained by government involvement.  Although they are not 
politically recognized, many of their projects are funded by municipal monetary aid once 
they collaborate with OTBs.  This essentially removes their autonomous status giving 
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even further evidence of the states control.   
Bringing power closer to the people has given false hope to communities in 
relieving their thirst for survival.  State decisions have caused communities to feel 
abandoned, but they remain pacified due to their impulse for desired independence.  It 
can be said autonomy is only achieved once they give up democratic representation.  The 
exact process the LPP set out to do.  This creates the illusion of independence while 
political achievements stagger in their OTBs.  Where decentralization provides 
“opportunity for the representation ...deserve[d]” it also leads to “divisions within the 
community, difficulty in policymaking, and disillusionment among the population” (K. 
West, 2015; p. 50).  Decentralization has caused citizens to have more trust in their 
governments, but overall has decreased their “evaluation of local services” increasing 
emphasis on the inconsistency of the system (p. 62).   
Although an autonomous water supply remains popular, over 80% of 
Cochabamba residents agree that complete network coverage from SEMAPA would be 
the best solution to end their dependence on private-well owners and lower water prices 
(Ledo, 2013).  The willingness to accept aid from SEMAPA emphasizes their struggle 
and also their adamancies on refusing governmental involvement.  On one hand, 
independence is desired, and on the other, more efficient aid is needed from outside 
sources.  
The Law of Popular Participation reestablishes the central government’s role once 
it requires funding to be provided on their part.  The source of this funding comes from 
Bolivia’s industrial sector and its obligatory relationship with outside investors.  
Therefore, in order for the funding to be available, and to monetarily support the 
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local/urban sector, the country is dependent on exporting materials.  Bolivia’s neoliberal 
vein is reopened by giving the central government complete control while removing any 
accountability for the livelihoods of the people.   
That is to say, even though the economic growth of the country is notable, it is 
still seen as growth forged by the state and it is the state that becomes praised for their 
outward success.  In Bolivia, Evo Morales and the MAS party are virtually celebrated for 
authoritative measures that were taken to nationalize resources, while in one of its largest 
cities, human rights are diminished as water continues to be privatized. 
By nationalizing resources, Evo Morales was attempting to end some foreign 
dependency and increase revenue for the state (Carasik, 2014).  As municipality aid 
increased to over 1200% after decentralization and the LPP (Faguet, 2012), the extraction 
of natural resources that cause extreme environmental damage come disguised as benefits 
for communities and, altogether increase the appeal of a decentralized system.  Here, 
more extraction equals more monetary aid and continued autonomy.  Bolivia’s 
hydrocarbon exportation industry fuels more than half of the country’s revenue.  
Petroleum gas alone reaches rates of approximately 48%.  A positive trade balance of 
$996 million and past debt relief by the IMF and World Bank result in a budget surplus.  
In 2013, the country’s GDP reached $30.6 billion (Simoes, 2016).  This is regrettably at 
the expense of extreme ecological and social degradation.  Transnational and foreign 
petroleum concessions invade not only insurmountable portions of “protected areas”, but 
are also securing indigenous-occupied regions (Munoes, 2015).   
It is surprising to see the number of years in Bolivia in the context of unfulfilled 
water rights that have gone unexpressed by marginalized communities.  This is especially 
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puzzling for a country whose citizens have embarked on numerous uprisings against their 
state and some of which, were quite successful.  The organizational skills inherent to the 
many indigenous families in Bolivia have not only been associated with the 
insurmountable achievements of development in informal lands, but have since been 
regarded as the fount behind The Water War’s success.  It is important to note that during 
the period the Bechtel Corporation controlled the city’s water system, the price hike was 
only experienced in the more affluent northern zones and did not affect the indigenous 
that live in the south. Nonetheless, they became the power horse behind the movement 
once Law 2029 threatened their autonomy (Ledo, 2013).  
Since decentralization, water-poor areas have been forced to turn their attention 
inward, establishing water committees that face technological and economical 
disadvantages against private networks and well owners.  A competitive market 
exponentially increases the control that private entities will have on the poor. Today, 
instead of making demands on the state, the water-poor are concentrating their energy on 
bettering the conditions of their own lives through water committees (Olivera M, 2014).  
Their independence and strength, epitomized in the Water War proves the 
inability of what decentralization has intended to accomplish.  The decline of social 
unrest against unsatisfactory water provisions does not entail competence in 
decentralization to mitigate social unrest, but rather a lack of connectivity to the state.  
This has lead some to argue that it is not so much the empowerment of local communities 
but more so the removed responsibility the state enjoys that makes decentralization 
appealing (Kohl, 2001).  In a way, neoliberalism has found its missing piece.  Its 
demoralizing effects are able to remain while particular policies eliminate the possibility 
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of social unrest that has historically lead to its demise. 
Bolivia’s constitution states that it is the responsibility of the government, in 
collaboration with public participation, to provide the provisions, management, 
regulations, and protection of accessible water to all people (Article 374, 2009).  Ledo 
(2013) emphasizes the constitutional requirement that the government takes the necessary 
strategy in order to make this a reality, and especially focusing on the “most vulnerable” 
(pg. 3).  Because separation of the state and local sectors exist in Bolivia, the citizens are 
being neglected by the same power that, paradoxically, agreed to the constitutional 
human right to water.  The effort on Central Itocta’s part alone provides enough evidence 
to suggest that there are communities capable of participating but do not receive the 
promised support.  
Even though Bolivia’s resources are now nationalized and human rights are 
constitutionalized, neoliberalism persists in Bolivia’s dependency on foreign interest.  
Evo’s extractavist mentality increases industrial exportation that in turn strengthens 
outside relationships.  In Bolivia’s decentralized system, the government is praised for 
their political and economic achievements at the expense of the people and land.  
Bolivia’s people go thirsty, believing it is due to their failed autonomy, while their land is 
continuously stripped in order to fuel the same system that gives them that same failed 
autonomy.  With decentralization, their political voice will be heard, but flounder due to 
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Conclusion	  	  
Indeed decentralization has provided the economic assistance, but what is lacking 
may be the technical assistance or expertise necessary for actual improvements in water 
provisions.  Both were non-existent in Central Itocta and created their dilemma. These 
inconsistencies in a decentralized state misrepresent the social complexity of governing 
of urban areas.  If decentralization is to ever be considered a functioning political 
framework, it must be mostly beneficial for all municipalities and all people who may not 
live within a city’s political boundaries but are still constituents in the cities fundamental 
arrangement and indefinitely its socio-hydroscape. 
 Inequality between north and south areas of Cochabamba is real. People are 
struggling, paying more for their right to live than others in the same geographical area. 
On paper, the government has given Bolivians the right to live well, but the reality is, as 
some people can achieve this level of "living well", others are only trying to simply live.  
A local-scale capitalist market will always result in extreme class segregation, 
discovering winners and losers through racial, geographic, and ethnical differences.  
However, when the market pivots around products that are also basic human needs, the 
struggle to advance your position in the system is hinged on the means for survival.  As 
long as the market persists, the lower class will be forever linked and dependent on those 
in control. 
Neither privatization nor decentralization has managed to match the capacity for 
service provisions that will meet Cochabambino’s needs.  Either a change in the states 
role that can keep constitutional promises and regulating private networks will have to 
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occur or OTBs and water committees will address the inadequacies by pressuring the 
state in something comparable to the Water War. 
This study focuses on one site in particular. Central Itocta is however one single 
example of many OTBs in Cochabamba’s south zone that suffer from lack of adequate 
water distribution and sanitation.  In fact, District 14 is a model for the surrounding areas 
because of its numerous success stories and achievements within their water-committees.  
Many other districts are far worse off.  With the city’s majority living in water-poor 
areas, there is room to continue this study for every unique experience.  This is doable as 
the majority of civilians in zona sur belong to one of approximately 200 water-
committees.  This is not an insurmountable number.  I believe it is imperative to gather 
more empirical information in order to distinguish the exact reasons municipal aid is 
inefficient in supporting the communities in the south that are abundant in neighborhood-
managed water committees, and are equipped to participate with increased funding and/or 
state implemented regulations on private companies.  
Further research should explore the capacity of water committees and their 
relationships to each other.  To better understand their power and limitations would give 
way to possible collaborations within other private and public entities. There certainly is 
room in better understanding how water committees are able to strengthen their technical 
and political forces in a more collaborative fashion.  Small-scale organizations such as 
NGOs are far too scarce in order to support all of Bolivia’s water-poor region let alone 
Cochabamba’s zona sur.  
This study attempts to uncover the disheartening dilemma that faces the citizens 
of urban areas in developing countries that are undermined by the state to urban 
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inconsistencies in regards to their political relations.  Cochabamba is not alone as many 
cities in the developing world suffer from some of the exact repercussions involving 
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